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I
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 380293-CA
Plaintiff-Respondent,

RICHARD WARENSKI,
Category No. 2
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of" Appeals has jurisdiction
^ui^uai.. uo Section 73-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotate:! I^S'-fi?
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GUILTY?
III.

SHOULD DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION BE REVERSED AS A MATTER

OF LAW?

STATUTES
Section 58-37-3(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 9, 1937, an Information was Issued against the
defendant, Rick Warenski, charging him with cultivation of
marijuana in violation of Section 53-37-3(1)(a), Utah Criminal
Code, as amended.

It alleged that on or about September 8, 1987,

the defendant, Rick Warenski, did knowingly and intentionally
produce a controlled substance, to wit:

marijuana.

On September

3, 1987, Officer Larry Patterson of the Utah County Sheriffs
Department, a trained pilot, flew an aircraft in the Utah County
area.

He had with him Sergeant Alex Hunt and Sergeant Jens Horn

of the Utah County Sheriff's Department.
officers were searching for marijuana.

(Tr. 168-169).

These

In the Salem area of Utah

County, the officers spotted what they described as approximately
100 six to eight foot tall marijuana plants.

(Tr. 170).

No

persons were spotted on the property by the officers while
observing from the airplane.

Immediately after the alleged

marijuana was spotted, the officers landed the airplane and
2

approximately
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Defendant Warenski was placed under arrest and transported
to the Utah County Jail.

Defendant Warenski did not reside at

the property where the marijuana was growing, the same being
owned and occupied by co-defendants, Richard Miranda and Terry
Miranda.

Defendant Warenski was and is a resident of the city of

Pleasant Grove, a city located approximately 20 miles north of
Salem. (Tr. 268-269).

Richard and Terry Miranda, after being

advised of their Miranda Rights, made statements to officers of
the Utah County Sheriff's Department and admitted that they had
cultivated the marijuana, were very proud of it, that it was very
beautiful and had a value of approximately $200,000.00.
-248).

(Tr. 244

Richard and Terry Miranda also explained to officers the

process employed by them in setting up and caring for the
marijuana garden.

They also explained the expense of so doing.

(Tr. 262-263, 265).
Defendant Rick Warenski made no statements to the police and
was not observed

inside the residence of Richard and Terry

Miranda at any time.
At the conclusion of the State's case, counsel for the
defendant Rick Warenski made a motion to dismiss the information
against Rick Warenski upon the grounds and for the reasons that
defendant Warenski had been found in a place where marijuana was
growing, but there was no evidence whatsoever

that he was

cultivating the same or had anything to do with the cultivation
4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT WARENSKI'S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE STATE'S INFORMATION, WHICH MOTION WAS MADE
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF AND AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL.
Section 58-37-3(1)(A)(a)(i) provides as follows:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally produce,
manufacture or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance.
Defendant Warenski was charged with violations of the above
quoted section of the Utah Controlled

Substances Act.

The

Supreme Court of the State of Utah, has interpreted this statute
in a number of cases involving facts very similar to if not
exactly on point with the facts of this case.

The first such

case is that of State v. Schroff, 514 P.2d 795, (Utah 1973).

In

Schroff, one LaVar Brachen discovered that in one of his fields
someone was cultivating two small patches of plants which he
suspected were marijuana.

The Sheriff of Washington County was

notified and on the same day the sheriff and Brachen made an
examination of the areas.

The plants were growing on high ground

and were not watered by irrigation of the other farming areas.
Depressions had been made adjacent to the plants and the ground
surrounding the plants was moist.

Buckets and jugs were found

near a creek which was. a short distance from the areas abovementioned.

Footprints led from the areas to the creek.

6

The

areas were placed under surveillance by the sheriff's department.
On August 2, 1972, the defendant was observed crossing one of the
fields near the areas where the marijuana was growing.

On August

8, 1972, the defendant was observed picking leaves from one of
the plants and placing them in a plastic bread wrapper sack.

The

defendant was placed under arrest and charged with the offense of
cultivation

of marijuana

in violation of Section

8(1 ) (A)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated.
defendant

While

58-37-

in custody

the

made essentially the following statement to the

arresting officers:

"Why didnft we go catch some of these

junkies that are peddling dope and leave us with our marijuana
alone?"

The defendant was convicted by jury verdict after trial

and appealed his conviction claiming that the evidence was
insufficient to support the charge of cultivation of marijuana.
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant and stated:
The evidence taken as a whole would only support a
charge that the defendant was in possession of
marijuana. Possession alone is insufficient to show
that the defendant cultivated or produced the
substance. We conclude that the defendant's conviction
must be reversed and it is ordered that the Information
be dismissed.
In 1983, the Court decided the case of State v. Anderton,
668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983).

In Anderton, Carl L. and Lana G.

Anderton, husband and wife, were convicted of the offenses of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for value and
production of marijuana.

The case was tried to the Court.
7

The

facts which were either stipulated or proven were that both of
the defendants owned and resided in the residence searched by
officers of the Roosevelt Police Department pursuant to a search
warrant.

The search produced the following:

three planters with

four marijuana plants growing in them; one brown paper bag
containing two plastic bags each of marijuana; one plastic bag
containing 7.8 ounces of marijuana^ one plastic bag containing
4.1 ounces of marijuana; one brown paper bag which contained
eight smaller plastic bags of marijuana, each of the smaller bags
being approximately one ounce; one foil wrapped chunk of "hash"
weighing 10,2 grams; one plastic bag of green plant material; one
film canister of gveen
rolling papers*

plant material; two packages of cigarette

At the time of arrest, Mr. Anderton, stated:

"My wife doesn't know anything about this.
everything."

I just came home with

Evidence at the trial indicated that a confidential

informant had "personally observed the substance in question."
The Andertons appealed their convictions and challenged the
sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the search warrant.
In addition, Mrs. Anderton, contended

that the evidence was

insufficient to convict her of the crimes charged.

On this

latter issue, the author of the opinion for the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Hall, concluded:
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment of the trial court as we are obliged to
do, this writer concludes that it adequately supports
the conviction of both defendants. The quantity of
8

marijuana and hashish, which included live marijuana
plants, was too large for personal consumption, and it
was found in the defendants' home, which they owned and
resided in as husband and wife.
It was reasonable for the trial court to infer
from the attendant facts and circumstances that
contraband, particularly the potted plants of marijuana
was in plain view*
The majority of the court reached a different conclusion and
reversed

the conviction

of defendant

Lana G.

Anderton.

Supporting its conclusion, the majority stated:
•..There is no evidence in the record which shows Lana
Anderton's knowing or intentional involvement in the
production of marijuana. The only evidence is that of
joint residence in the home where the plants were
found. There is nothing to establish how long the
plants had been there or where they were found • When
the facts of this case are considered, particularly in
light of the cases cited above, it requires a "leap of
faith," to find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on
the basis of her marital relationship with her husband
and their joint occupancy of the home.
The reasoning of State v. Anderton was followed by the
Supreme Court in State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1935).

In Fox,

the Weber County Sheriff's Office received an anonymous letter
stating that seven-foot marijuana plants were growing at 249
Harris Street in Ogden, Utah.
Fox.

The residence belonged to Gary

Acting on the tip, an officer went to the residence to

investigate.

He saw that the yard contained

greenhouses, one of which was attached to the house.

two opaque
The officer

could observe marijuana in the greenhouses and obtained a search
warrant for the house and greenhouses.
bedrooms.

The home had two

One bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry tools,
9

and a plastic identification card for Clive Fox.

The second

bedroom contained men's clothing, women's underclothing, a
checkbook and bank deposit slips with Gary Fox's name on them, a
book entitled "Marijuana Grower's Guide", and marijuana and drug
paraphernalia.
paraphernalia.

The kitchen contained marijuana and other
Both greenhouses contained marijuana plants.

One

of the greenhouses was accessible from the kitchen and had no
outside entrance.

The kitchen and greenhouse were not blocked

off or separated from the remainder of the house and the entire
house was very humid.

There were items of mail addressed to both

Gary and Clive found in the house.

Gary owned the property.

The

telephone listing was in Clive's name and had been for four
years.

The police did not see either Gary or Clive at the house

but a neighbor testified that he had seen both of them there.

At

the close of the State's case, both defendant's moved to dismiss
the charges because of insufficient evidence.
denied.

Both ^ere

The motion was

convicted of production of a controlled

substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction

of Gary Fox and reversed the conviction of Clive Fox.

Following

the Anderton reasoning, the Court stated the following:
Because one of the greenhouses was attached to the
house and was openly accessible from the kitchen, the
trier of fact could reasonably find that Clive Fox knew
that marijuana was being grown in the house. However,
to prove that he had constructive possession of the
marijuana, the evidence must also show that he had the
10

power and intent to exercise dominion or control over
the marijuana. There is no evidence that Clive Fox had
any intent to grow or to possess the marijuana in the
greenhouses. While he may have had knowledge of the
existence of marijuana on the premises, that is not the
equivalent of constructive possession.
In the cases just reviewed, the facts showed that all of the
defendants were in close proximity to and had a knowledge of the
presence of marijuana or other contraband substances.

In two of

the cases, the defendants resided in the location where the
marijuana or contraband substances were found.

In this case,

defendant Warenski was found present where marijuana was growing
but the defendant resided 20 miles away from the property where
the marijuana was growing.

Apparently the defendant had only

been in the area where the marijuana was growing for a few
minutes before confronted by the deputies of the Utah County
Sheriff's Department.

No other evidence suggested that defendant

Warenski had any other connection or tie with the property.

On

the other hand the facts clearly show that the property was owned
and resided in by Richard and Terri Miranda.

Several marijuana

plants were found in a harvested condition inside the home along
with other paraphernalia and books giving instructions on how to
grow marijuana.

Further, the evidence clearly shows that both

Terri and Richard Miranda acknowledged that they were growing the
marijuana, were proud of the marijuana, knew the value of the
marijuana
marijuana.

and the investment

into the production

of the

The Mirandas did not implicate defendant Warenski in
11

the cultivation or production of marijuana.

The mere fact that

defendant Warenski was standing with his back to the officer as
he entered into the area where the marijuana was growing and that
he was facing a shower stall containing water in the tub portion
of it and doing something which the officer could not determine,
is not sufficient evidence to form a nexus between defendant
Warenski and the marijuana to suggest or cause a conclusion that
he was producing or participating in the production of marijuana.
At the very most, defendant Warenski knew that marijuana was
growing here.

Based upon the facts of this case, and the rulings

of the Supreme Court in the cases heretofore cited, defendant
Warenski, contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss and that the case should be reversed and the
information should be dismissed.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
VERDICT OF GUILTY.
The arguments supporting this point are the same as or
closely related to those which have been made by defendant In
support of his argument under Point I.

In the interest of

brevity and to avoid cumulative argument, counsel and defendant
simply elect to support Point II by referring the Court to the
arguments made in the cases reviewed under Point I.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to
12

dismiss the information against him both at the time when the
motion was made at the conclusion of the prosecution's case and
at the time when the motion was made at the conclusion of the
trial.

Defendant at most knew that marijuana was growing.

No

evidence was presented by the prosecution which demonstrated that
a sufficient nexus existed between

the defendant

and the

contraband to permit an inference that the defendant knew of its
existence and had both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over and was responsible for the controlled
substance in production.

The evidence was wholly insufficient to

support a conviction by the jury of the defendant Rick Warenski.
Based upon this Court's decisions in the wSchroff, Anderton,
and Fox cases, the defendant respectfully requests this Court to
reverse

his conviction

and

to order

a dismissal

of the

Information against him.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

13
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ADDENDUM

STEVEN B. KIULPACK
Utah County Attorney
37 East Center, Suite 200
Prow, Utah 84601
g p a w T S H FORK

DEPARTMENT. EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT.

UTAH COUNTY. FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT. STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
INFORMATION

Plaintiff.

vs.

RICHARD MERANDA, TERRI MERANDA,
and RICK WARENSKI

Defendants).
DOB:
12-27-57
DOB: . 6 - 1 5 - 6 1
DOTH—H-4-b4

Criminal No.

_ _ _ ^ ^ _
"

_

_

STEVEN B. KII1PACK, Utah County Attorney. State of Utah, accuses the defendant® of the following
crimes):

CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA, a felony of the third degree, in
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, in that they, on or about 8 September 1987, in Utah
County, STate of Utah, did knowingly and intentionally produce
a controlled substance, to-wit: Marijuana.

This Information is based on evidence sworn to by:
Authorized for prosecution by.
by:

Alex Hunt,

UCSO

Ikf WM^

/
COMPLAINANT

UTAH COdftfY ATTORNEY

DEPUTY

'

asm
J

Estimated time for preliminary hearing:

Subscribed and sworn to before me
day of Si

_

19 *
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« » PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

theory is applicable in this context only to
suits for infringement of patent that presupposes ownership.14 Defendant has no
ownership rights in the patent and a suit to
establish those rights would be governed by
the three-year statute of limitations, which
began to run at the time the patent was
issued.
Since defendant's action is barred by the
statute of limitations, we have no need to
reach the merits of the question as to
whether plaintiff is a bona fide purchaser
for value.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., and J. DUFFY PALMER, District Judge, concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
HOWE, J., having disqualified himself,
does not participate herein; J. DUFFY
PALMER, District Judge, sat.

RCYNUMCtSrSHM)
(O IttYIM

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Carl L. and Lana G. ANDERTON,
Defendants and Appellants.

CJ., and Durham, J., held that: (1) affidavit in support of warrant for search of
house was not insufficient even though it
did not set forth time and place of informant's observations or by whom marijuana
was possessed where affidavit set forth sufficient underlying circumstances to support
conclusions reached by affiant and to support reliability and credibility of informant,
and (2) evidence was insufficient to support
conviction of defendant's wife where conviction was based solely on her joint ownership of and residence in home where drugs
were found.
Defendant's conviction affirmed; defendant's wife's conviction reversed.
Durham, J., filed opinion concurring
separately in result in which Stewart and
Howe, JJ,, concurred.
1. Drugs and Narcotics *=»188
Affidavit in support of warrant for
search of defendant's house for marijuana
was not insufficient even though it failed to
set forth time and place of informant's observation or by whom marijuana was pq**(
sessed where sufficient underlying circumstances were set forth to support conclusions reached by affiant and to support'
reliability and credibility of informant in
that affidavit recited that informant personally observed the marijuana and was
couched in present-tense language describ*
ing ongoing criminal activity.

Defendants were convicted in the
Fourth District Court, Duchesne County,
David Sam, J., of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute for value and production of marijuana, and they appealed.
The Supreme Court, in opinions by Hall,

1 Searches and Seizures *=»3.4
Blank portions of affidavit in support
of search warrant would be disregarded de^
spite defendants' contention that blank por^
tions rendered affidavit void in light qt,
statute providing that every paper made qr
issued by a justice must be issued without a
blank to be filled in by another where the**
was no contention on the part of defendants
that blanks complained of in any way i&\
fringed upon their substantial right*?
Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 30; U.C.A.1953, 7723-9, 78^5-24; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend: 4

14. M. & T. Chemicals, Inc. v. International
Business Machines Corp., 403 F.Supp. 1145

(S.D.N.Y.1975), affd, 542 F.2d 1165 (2nd Or.
1976).

No. 18506.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 15, 1983.

STATE v.

NDERTON

Clte««8P.2d

tftS (Utah 1SS3)

Utah

1259

abstracted as follows: Defendants owned
and resided in the residence searched by
officers of the Roosevelt Police Department
pursuant to a search warrant The search
produced the following:
a. Three (3) planters with four (4)
green plants growing in them.
b. One (1) brown paper bag containing two (2) plastic bags each, [sic] of
which contained green plant material.
One (1) plastic bag containing 7.8 ounces
of material and one (1) containing 4.1
ounces of material [sic].
c. One (1) brown paper bag which
4. Criminal Law *=»1159.2(7)
contained
a large plastic bag which in
Accepted standard of appellate review
turn
contained
eight (8) smaller plastic
permits Supreme Court to overturn convicbags
of
green
plant
material. Each of
tion only when it is made to appear that
the
smaller
bags
contained
approximately
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain
one
(1)
oujice
of
material.
The large
reasonable doubt of guilt, and Supreme
plastic
bag
also
contained
one
(1), [sic]
Court should only interfere when evidence
foil-wrapped,
[sic]
chunk
of
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5. Drugs and Narcotics * » U 8
e. One (1) film canister of green plant
Evidence was insufficient to support
material.
conviction of defendant for possession of
f. Two (2) packages of cigarette rollmarijuana with intent to distribute for valing papers.
ue and production of marijuana where conIt was further stipulated that the plants
viction was based solely on her joint ownership of and residence in home where mari- and the green plant material were in fact
juana was found. U.CA.1958, 58-37-S. marijuana, and in reference to the bags of
marijuana defendant Carl L. Anderton stated, "My wife doesn't know anything about
Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for defendants this. I just came home with everything."
and appellants.
The evidence at trial was that the subject
David L. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for search warrant was issued by a justice of
plaintiff and respondent
the peace, John B Gale, upon the affidavit
3. Searches and Seizures «»&8(1)
Magistrate's failure to comply with
statute requiring return of search warrant
and related documents to appropriate court
within 15 days after return on execution of
the warrant constituted nothing more than
failure to perform ministerial act which did
not affect validity of search warrant or
search conducted thereunder in absence of
any showing that failure to comply with
statute had any adverse affect upon defendants' substantial rights. U.CA.1953,
77-2S--0.

HALL, Chief Justice:
Defendants were convicted of the offenses of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute for value and production
of marijuana.1 On appeal, they challenge
the propriety of the search of their residence, and defendant Lana G. Anderton
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support her conviction.
The case was tried to the court, sitting
without a jury, on partially stipulated facts
1. In violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 58-37^8.

of Officer Jeff Stagg of the Roosevelt Police Department that a confidential informant had related to him that he had "personally observed the substance in question."
It was also recited in the affidavit that
Officer Stagg had conferred extensively
with the informant who had previously cooperated with him, "providing truthful, cogent information, resultant in bodily injury
to CI." Portions of the preprinted form
affidavit allowing for insertion of the date
of the informant's observation and the date
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does not set forth the time and place, nor
by whom the marijuana was possessed.
Furthermore, since authority was sought to
search a vehicle in addition to the residence,
the location of the marijuana was unknown
to affiant
As was observed in Spineili regarding the
notion of probable cause:
[Pjrobability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of
probable cause4 . . . [l]n judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to
be confined by niggardly limitations or by
restrictions on the use of their common
sense,1 and that their determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.*
398 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct 584, 590, 21
LEd.2d 637.
Applying the foregoing standards in the
instant case, the affidavit contains adequate facts to support the magistrate's
finding of probable cause to issue the warrant Read as a whole, and in a commonsense way,? the affidavit sets forth sufficient underlying circumstances to support
the conclusions reached by the affiant and
to support the reliability and credibility of
the informant

the information was given to the affiant
were left blank.
The affidavit further recited that the
marijuana was located at defendants' residence, which was identified by street address, and in a pickup truck identified by
make, model, color and license number.
For the stated purpose of a nighttime
search, the affiant recited that he was positive of the location of the marijuana because "I have conferred extensively with an
informant of a confidential nature, who has
related to me the information contained
herein."
The search warrant was issued at 9:42
p.m. on May 3, 1981, and the search was
conducted that same night The search
warrant, the supporting affidavit and the
officer's return of the property seized was
retained by Judge Gale until August 27,
1981, when they were turned over to Officer Wayne Embleton for use at the preliminary hearing conducted by the circuit court
Thereafter, Officer Embleton kept the documents in his possession until the trial, at
which time he testified that they had not
been altered.
Defendants first contend that the evidence should have been suppressed because
the affidavit in support of the warrant
failed to state probable cause for the search
in that it did not meet the two-pronged test
advanced in Aguilar v. Texas} followed in
Spineili v. United States} which requires 1)
that "underlying circumstances" be set
forth sufficient for the magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's conclusion, and 2) that the affiant
support his claim that the informant was
"credible" and his information was "reliable."

Unlike Aguilar, the affidavit in this case
recites that the informant personally observed the marijuana. Also, the affiant's
conclusion that a search of the residence
and vehicle would produce the contraband
was supported by the further recitals that
the informant "has related to me the information contained herein," verified by the
affiant's own investigation that "the individual named herein sells contraband in
quantity."

[1] Defendants urge that the affidavit
does not meet the Aguilar teat because it

It is also to be observed that during the
pendency of this appeal, in the case of ////-

2. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 LEd.2d 723
(1964).

5. Citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 LEd.2d 684 (1965).

3. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 LEd.2d 637
(1969).

6. Citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
80 S.Ct. 725. 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); see also
State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715 (1983).

4. Citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223,
13 LEd.2d 142 (1964).

7. United States v. Ventresca, supra n. 5.
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/20/5 v. Gates,1 the United States Supreme
Court abandoned the rigid "two-pronged
test" advanced in Aguilar and Spinelli in
favor of reaffirming the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has
informed probable cause determinations.
In so doing, the Court had this to say:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the "veracity" and "basis
of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place. And
the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . concluding]" that
probable cause existed. Jones v. United
States, supra, 362 U.S., at 271 [80 S.Ct at
736]. We are convinced that this flexible,
easily applied standard will better
achieve the accommodation of public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires than does the approach
that has developed from Aguilar and Spinelll
— US.
at
, 103 S.Ct.
2317, at 2332, 76 LEd.2d 527.
The "totality of the circumstances test"
as reaffirmed in Gates lends even further
support for the conclusion reached by the
magistrate in the instant case that probable
cause existed for the issuance of the search
warrant
Defendants also rely upon Rosencranz v
United States,9 which interpreted United
States v. Ventrescalf as requiring the affidavit to specifically set forth the time of
the informant's observations. We do not so
interpret Ventresca.
8.

—US
(1983)

-, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L.Ed 2d 527

9. 356 F2d 310 (1st Clr 1966).
10. Supra n 5
11. Citing Jones v United States, 362 U S at
270, 80 S Ct at 735 In accord State v Romero, supra n 6

The standard established in Ventresca is
that of commonsense, which was stated
therein as follows:
[Affidavits for search warrants, such as
the one involved here, must be tested and
interpreted by magistrates and courts in
a commonsense and realistic fashion.
380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct at 745.
[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal
cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded
warrants.11
The affidavit in the instant case, couched
as it is in present-tense language which
describes on-going criminal activity, clearly
refutes any contention that it was based
upon stale information.11 Further applying
the commonsense rule espoused in Ventresca, the affidavit on its face presented a
substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude: 1) that the information received by
the affiant was recent and contemporaneous; 2) that contraband was probably possessed by defendant Carl Anderton; and 8)
that realistically the search should include
not only the residence, but the vehicle as
well.
[2] Defendants next contend that the
blank portions of the affidavit rendered it
void in light of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-6-24,
which provides:
Every paper made or issued by a justice, except a subpoena, must be issued
without a blank to be filled in by another;
otherwise it is void.
There is some considerable question
whether the foregoing statute applies to the
affidavit in question since it would appear
that it is not "a paper made or issued by a
justice" containing blanks "to be filled in by
another." However, we do not address that
issue, for in the absence of any contention
12. In accord State v day, 7 WashApp 631,
501 P 2d 603 (1972), Guzewicz v Siayton, 366
FSupp 1402 (EDVal973) f Covington v
State, 129 Ga App 150, 199 S E.2d 346 (1973),
State v Boudreawc, La, 304 So 2d 343 (1974)
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on the part of defendants that the blanks
complained of in any way infringed upon
their substantial rights, the Court is obliged
to disregard the "defect" in the affidavit by
reason of the content of Rule 30, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides as follows:
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. [Emphasis added.]
[3] Defendants also contend that the
magistrate's failure to return the search
warrant and the related documents to the
appropriate court within fifteen days after
the return on execution of the warrant in
compliance with U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-9
rendered the documents void. Again, however, defendants have made no showing
that the magistrate's failure to comply with
the statute had any adverse effect upon
their substantial rights, nor have they
shown that such failure in any way compromised the integrity of the documents. We
therefore conclude that the violation of the
statute constituted nothing more than the
failure to perform a ministerial act which
did not affect the validity of the search
warrant and the search conducted thereunder."
The remaining contention on appeal is
that of defendant Lana Anderton that the
evidence was insufficient to convict her of
the crimes charged. The State's rejoinder
is that not only was the evidence at trial
sufficient to convict, but there was an absence of substantial or believable evidence
necessary to generate reasonable doubt of
guilt
13. State v. Romero, supra n. 6; see also Wright
v. SUte, Okl.Cr., 552 P.2d 1157 (1976); People
v. Wilson, 173 Cola 536, 482 P26 355 (1971);
United States v. Wilson, 451 F.2d 209 (5th
Cir.1971).
14. SUte v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977).
15. SUte v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980).
16. SUte v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P2d 1161
(1980).
17. Nevcrtheleis, t majority of the Court concludes to the contrary and opines that the evi-

[4] The accepted standard of appellate
review permits this Court to overturn a
conviction only when it is made to appear
that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of guilt,14 and we
should only interfere when the evidence is
so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable
men could not possibly have determined
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt11
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court
as we are obliged to do,11 this writer concludes that it adequately supports the conviction of both defendants. The quantity
of marijuana and hashish, which included
live marijuana plants, was too large for
personal consumption, and it was found in
the defendants' home, which they owned
and resided in as husband and wife.
It was reasonable for the trial court to
infer from the attendant facts and circumstances that the contraband, particularly
the potted plants of marijuana, was in plain
view. It was also reasonable to infer from
the stipulation of the parties that both defendants were present during the search, at
which time defendant Carl L. Anderton volunteered that "my wife doesn't know anything about this. I just came home with
everything." Furthermore, in their brief
on appeal, defendants concede that they
were both present during the search.17
The fact that defendant Lana Anderton
was not named in the search warrant is of
no moment, because the resultant search
and the stipulation of facts placed her in
constructive, if not actual, possession of a
large quantity of contraband which was
obviously intended for distribution.
dence of constructive possession was insufficient to support the conviction of defendant
Lana G. Anderton. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court, it supports the conclusion that the contraband was found in the presence of both defendants, in open view and
readily accessible to each, all of which meets
the standards of constructive possession laid
down in the case of United States v. Davis, 562
F.2d 681 (D.C.Cir.1977), and others relied upon
by the majority.
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The only exculpatory evidence presented
to the trial court was defendant Carl Anderton's assertion that "my wife doesn't
know anything about this. I just came
home with everything." The trial court
apparently discounted the statement as being only an act of chivalry made in an
effort to exonerate his wife.
[S] It lies within the prerogative of the
trial court to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the .witnesses, and
this Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues of
fact that are supported by substantial, credible and admissible evidence.16 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court has concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the conviction of the defendant Lana G.
Anderton, and her conviction is therefore
reversed.
The conviction and judgment of the trial
court as to the defendant Carl L. Anderton
are affirmed in all respects.
OAKS, J., concurs.
DURHAM, Justice (concurring separately
in result):
[4,5] I concur with the opinion of the
Chief Justice in affirming Carl Anderton's
conviction of the crimes of production of
marijuana and possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute for value. See, U.C.A.,
1953, §§ 58-37-«(aXi) & (ii) (Supp.1981).
However, I believe that there is insufficient
evidence to convict his wife Lana Anderton.
The standard of review, as cited by the
Chief Justice's opinion, authorizes this
Court to overturn a conviction when the
evidence is so lacking or inconclusive that
reasonable minds must entertain a doubt of
guilt The evidence in this case is so inadequate as to compel such reasonable doubt of
guilt in the case of Mrs. Anderton.
The issue here is whether the facts in the
record are sufficient to establish Mrs. An18. SUte v. Lamm, supm n. 15.
1. This case involved a husband and wife who,
following a warrant search of their home, were
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Police officers

derton's guilt for offenses which require
both knowledge and intent. See, U.C.A.,
1953, § 58-37-«(a) (Supp.1981). Of the two
elements of possession with intent to distribute, possession must first be shown.
While this Court has stated that "[unlawful possession does not necessarily mean
that the substance be found on the person
of the accused or that he have sole and
exclusive possession thereof," to prove constructive possession, the evidence must
show that the drugs were "subject to [the
accused's] dominion and control." State v.
Carlson, Utah, 685 ?M 72, 74 (1981) (footnotes omitted).1 Lana Anderton's conviction on this charge was based solely on her
joint ownership of and residence in the
home where the drugs were found. There
is substantial support for the rule that
where a defendant is in nonexclusive possession or occupancy of the premises on
which controlled substances are found,
there must be some additional incriminating
evidence to establish guilt of possession:
[P]roof of a proprietary interest in or
regular occupancy of the premises alone
is not sufficient to prove constructive possession.
United States v. Davis, 562 P^d 681, 693
(D.C.Cir.1977). (emphasis in original). The
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that:
There is no presumption of knowing or
intentional possession of the marijuana
from [defendant's] occupancy of the residence. Her occupancy of the premises as
a cotenantf however, is a factor to be
considered with other evidence in determining whether she had constructive possession.
Eckhart v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 447, 281
S.E.2d 858, 855 (1981) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d
1012,1016-18 (D.C.Cir.1982), Evans v. United States, 257 F2d 121 (9th Cir.1958). One
searched the bedroom and found guns, drugs
and paraphernalia, including sealing agent,
plasUc bags, measuring spoons, a funnel, a
strainer and scales. The charges against the
wife were dismissed.
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summary of the general rule reads as fol- fendant was participating with others in
lows:
the mutual use and enjoyment of the con[W]here the defendant is in nonexclusive traband"; Ford v. State, supra, at 382, 377
possession of premises on which illicit A.2d at 581-82 (quoting Folk v. State, 11
drugs are found, it cannot be inferred Md.App. 508, 514-18, 275 K2A 184, 187-89
that he knew of the presence of such (1971)); and 5) incriminating statements,
drugs and had control of them, unless Evans v. United States, supra?
there are other incriminating statements
Thus, it is clear that, in finding construcor circumstances tending to buttress such
tive
possession of controlled substances in
an inference.
nonexclusive
occupancy settings, courts
Annot, 56 AX.RA1 948, 957 (1974 & Supp.
have
relied
on
extensive
and detailed factu1982).
al evidence. In contrast, the facts as stipuIn light of the requirement of other inlated in this case' consist of a confirmation
criminating circumstances in addition to
mere occupancy, the facts of each case are that the defendants owned and resided in
critical and must be presented in detail. the house where the warrant search was
Some of the key factual determinations made, a list of the items found in that
which have supported findings of construc- search, most of which were enclosed in two
tive possession in other cases are: 1) the brown paper bags, and the statement made
defendant's presence at the time the drugs by defendant Carl Anderton that his wife
were found, with emphasis on the fact that knew nothing about the drugs and that he
the drugs were in plain or open view, see had just returned home with them. The
United States v. Lawson, supra; United only other relevant evidence in the record
States v. Davis, supra; Ford v. State, 37 consists of testimony regarding the
Md.App. 378, 377 AJM 577 (1977); Eckhart amounts of marijuana and hashish generalv. Commonwealth, supra; 2) the defend- ly kept by an individual for personal use.4
ant's access to the drugs, see United States There is no evidence as to where in the
v. Davis, supra; State v. Brown, 80 NJ. home the drugs were found or where the
587, 404 A.2d 1111, 1115 (1979); 3) the defendant Lana Anderton was when the
proximity of defendant to the drugs, see officers entered the house. Moreover, there
Ford v. State, supra, although "[m]ere prox- is no evidence of any incriminating conduct
imity to the controlled substance . . . is or statements of Lana Anderton. Thus,
insufficient to establish possession." Eck- there is nothing which establishes that the
hart v. Commonwealth, supra, at 450, 281 drugs were in her view, accessible or even
S.E.2d at 855; see also Wright v. Common- close to her, or that she was participating in
wealth, 217 Va. 669, 232 S.K2d 733 (1977) the use of the drugs or knew of their pres(where the defendant, although not residing ence in the house.
in the apartment, was found sitting in a
Similarly, there is no evidence in the recbedroom next to a friend who was injecting
himself with heroin, and substantial quanti- ord which shows Lana Anderton's knowing
ties of heroin were found three feet from or intentional involvement in the producthe defendant; the defendant was acquit- tion of marijuana. The only evidence is
ted despite evidence of history of heroin that of joint residence in the home where
use); 4) evidence indicating that the "de- the plants were found; there is nothing to
2. Other evidentiary factors which have been
recognized by courts in determining guilt of
possession in nonexclusive occupancy cases include suspicious behavior, previous sale of
drugs and drug use. See Annot., supra.*
3. There was no evidence offered by the State
on this issue except for a brief written stipulation of fact.

4. That testimony related to use amounts for an
individual. Presumably those amounts should
have been doubled to determine the amounts
for the personal consumption of both defendants.
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establish how long the plants had been
there or where they were found.
When the facts of this case are considered, particularly in light of the cases
cited above, it requires a "leap of faith" to
find that Lana Anderton is guilty solely on
the basis of her marital relationship with
her husband and their joint occupancy of
the home. In view of the lack of other
evidence, the self-inculpatory statement
made by Carl Anderton that he had "just
brought the drugs home" compels doubt

about his wife's guilt Lana Anderton's
conviction should therefore be reversed.
STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the
concurring opinion of DURHAM, J.

8

20 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
Plaintiff and Respondent

HALL, Chief Justice: (Dissenting)
I do not share the reasoning of the Court
in overturning State v Brady l
While the Utah Constitution affords the
right of appeal in all cases,2 that right may
be effectively waived or abandoned One who
escapes not only abandons his appeal, he also
abandons and forsakes the judicial system as
a whole He no longer relies upon it in any
respect, and to dismiss his appeal for that
reason is neither to be viewed as a forfeiture
of a constitutional right nor as a penalty
This is particularly demonstrated by the facts
of the instant case wherein Tuttle did not
voluntarily return to custody with any excuse
or justification for his behavior, but in fact
remained at large for a considerable length of
time. Had he not been tracked down,
arrested, and involuntarily returned to
custody, he no doubt would have remained at
large Only because of his reincarceration
does he again seek relief from the system
1 would not disturb the prior dismissal of
the appeal
Howe, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hall
1. Utah, 655 P.2d 1132(1982)
2. Art. I, §12.
Cue as

20 Utah Adv. Rep. 8
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Gary L. FOX,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20088
The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Oive Fox,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20089
FILED: October 18, 1985
SECOND DISTRICT
Hon. David E Roth
ATTORNEYS
H Don Sharp for Defendant and Appellant
David L Wilkinson, Earl F Donus for

STEWART, Justice:
Defendants Gary and Give Fox were
convicted of possession with intent to distribute and production of a controlled
substance in violation of U C A , 1953, §58
37-8(l)(a)(i) and §57 37 8(l)(a)(n) On
appeal, both defendants argue that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the charges
We affirm the conviction of Gary Fox and
reverse the conviction of Give Fox
In June 1983, the Weber County Sheriffs
Office received an anonymous letter stating
that 7-foot marijuana plants growing at 249
Harris Street in Ogden were soon to be harvested The residence belonged to Gary Fox
Acting on the tip, an officer went to the
residence to investigate He saw that the yard
contained two opaque greenhouses, one of
which was attached to the house The officer
was able to determine that one greenhouse
contained marijuana because a marijuana
leaf was pressed against the greenhouse That
same day, the officer obtained a search
warrant for the house and the greenhouses
and conducted a search while the premises
were unoccupied
The home had two bedrooms One
bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry
tools, and a plastic identification card for
Give which had expired April 15, 1982 The
second bedroom contained men's clothing,
women's underclothing, a checkbook and
bank deposit slips with Gary's name on them,
a book entitled Marijuana Grower's Guide,
marijuana and drug paraphernalia The
kitchen contained marijuana and other paraphernalia Both greenhouses contained
marijuana plants One of the greenhouses
was accessible from the kitchen and had no
outside entrance The kitchen and greenhouse
were not separated or blocked off from the
remainder of the house, and the entire house
was very humid In searching the house the
officers found mail addressed to both Gary
and Give
Gary owned the property He arranged for
the delivery of gas to the house, and the gas
bills were sent to him The telephone listing,
however, was in Give's name, and had been
since 1979
Neither Gary nor Give had been seen near
the house by the police Mr Seamon, a
neighbor, testified that he thought Gary and
Give lived at the house "I would see them
on weekends would be all," doing yard work
Mrs Seamon testified in response to a
question whether she knew who lived at 249
Harris 'Well, I had seen Give and Gary Fox
over there ' Neither witness remembered
seeing either Gary or Give at the house on
any specific occasion during the month

For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, sec the second section of this issue
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preceding the arrest, but remembered they
were absent for a period following the arrest.
An officer testified that the house appeared
to be occupied because the refrigerator and
cupboards contained food, and the kitchen
had both clean and dirty dishes in it.
At the close of the State's case, both Gary
and Clive moved to dismiss the charges
because of insufficient evidence. The motion
was denied. The trial court stated that the
defendants lived in or occupied the home,
and that there was "enough marijuana
growth for sale."
Both were convicted of production of a
controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for
value in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §58-378(lKa)(i) and §58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). On appeal,
the defendants renew their claim that there
was insufficient evidence to prove that they
grew marijuana and that the marijuana found
in the residence belonged to them or was for
distribution.
This Court may overturn a conviction for
insufficient evidence when it is apparent that
the evidence is insufficient to prove each
clement of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.. State v. Pctree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443,
444(1983).
A conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute requires
proof of two elements: (1) that defendant
knowingly and intentionally possessed "a controlled substance* and (2) that defendant
intended to distribute the controlled
substance to anpjher^y.C.A., 1953, §58-378(lXa)(ii). Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession.
However, actual physical possession is not
necessary to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance. State v. Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (1981). A conviction may also be based on constructive possession. Id. In Carlson, we held that constructive possession exists "where the contraband
is subject to [defendant's] dominion and
control." Id. However, per sons who might
know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and
who might even have access to them, but who
have no intent to obtain and use the drugs
can not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to
possess do not equal possession where there is
nj2_eyjdtacfi^i>£ intent .Jo make use of that
knowledge and ability.
To find that a defendant had constructive
possession of a drug or other contraband, it
is necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug
to permit an inference that the accused had
both the power and the intent to exercise
dominion and control over the drug. See
United States v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015,
1019-20 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
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Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir.
1984); United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681,
694 (1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part
concurring in part).
Whether a sufficient nexus between the
accused and the drug exists depends upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. State v.
Anderton, Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1983).
Ownership.. and/or^accupancy of the premises
upon which the drugs are found, although
important factors,, are not alone sufficient to
establish . constructive possession, especially
wb£fl._££Ciipancy is not exclusive. United
States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Some other factors which might
combine to show a sufficient nexus between
the accused and the drug are: incriminating
statements made by the accused, Allen v. State, 158 Ga. App. 691, 282 S.E.2d 126, 127
(1981) (defendant told unnamed individual
that defendant had $500 worth of marijuana); incriminating behavior of the accused,
United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.
1981) (defendant nodded affirmatively when
introduced as owner of cocaine, and
remained with drug during negotiations);
Francis v. State, Ala. App., 410 So.2d 469
(1982) (defendant slammed door in face of
police and ran back into the house yelling,
"throw it in the fire"); presence of drugs in a
specific area over which the accused had
control, such as a closet or drawer containing
the accused's clothing or other personal
effects, Walker v. United States, 489 F.2d
714, 715 (8th Cir.) (drugs found in closet containing defendant's clothing), cert, denied,
416 U.S. 990 (1974); presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects
or in a place over which the accused has
special control, United States v, James, 494
F.2d 1007, 1030-31 D.C. Cir.) (drug paraphernalia found in a locked box in defendant's
dresser), cert, denied sub nom., Jackson v.
United States, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974); Petley v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Or.)
(pipe containing marijuana residue found in
defendant's duffel bag), cert, denied, 400
U.S. 827 (1970). In every case, the determination that someone has constructive possession of drugs is a factual determination which
turns on the particular circumstances of the
case. Among these circumstances must be
facts which permit the inference that the
accused intended to use the drugs as his or
her own. A conviction for production of a
controlled substance requires evidence that
the accused knowingly and intentionally
produced the controlled substance. U.C.A.,
1953, §58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (supp. 1983); see
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709,
712 (1980); and evidence of possession may
be part of. a circumstantial link in the
necessary chain of evidence.
The evidence as to Gary sufficiently
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supports his convictions for production of a
controlled substance and possession of
marijuana with an intent to distribute. Gary
owned the property where the marijuana was
found. Although he may not have had
exclusive control or possession (in a practical
non-legal sense) of the premises, his nonexclusive possession and control combined
with other incriminating evidence to provide
an adequate foundation for the convictions.
State v. Andcrton, Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264
(1983). Gary owned the house. His occupancy
and control was evidenced by the presence of
his personal effects in the same room as marijuana, drug-related paraphernalia, and a
book entitled Marijuana Grower's
Guide.
Another room also contained marijuana and
drug paraphernalia. Because he was the
owner and occupier of the property and
because of the manner in which the greenhouses were constructed in proximity to the
house, one being accessible only through the
house, there is a reasonable inference that he
not only knew of the greenhouses and their
contents but also had the power and intent to
exercise dominion and control over the
marijuana located in them, and was responsible for growing the marijuana. Furthermore,
there was sufficient evidence that he intended
to distribute the marijuana. Where one
possesses a controlled substance in a quantity
too large for personal consumption, the trier
of fact can infer that the possessor had an
intent to distribute. State v. Anderton, Utah,
668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1983). The police found
approximately 2,850 mature marijuana plants
growing on Gary's property, an amount of
marijuana unquestionably too large for
personal use.
On these facts the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the conviction of Gary Fox of possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute, and production of a controlled
substance.
Because Qne of the greenhouses^ was
attached tq the house and was openly accessible from, the kitchen,, the trier of fact could
reasonably find that Clive Fox knew thai
marijuana was being grown in the house.
However, • to prove that he had constructive
possession of the marijuana, the evidence
must also show that he had the power and
intent to exercise dominion or control over
the marijuana. There is no evidence that
Clive Fox had any intent to grow or to
possess the marijuana in the greenhouses.
While he may have had knowledge of the
existence of marijuana on the premises, that
is not the equivalent of constructive possession. Indeed, evidence supporting the theory
of "constructive possession" must raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not
simply a bystander. That is, the evidence in
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its totality must show that defendant's
dominion or control over the area must have
been such that he in fact intended to exercise
dominion and control over the marijuana
The evidence showed that the telephone at
246 Harris Street was in Clive's name, that he
was seen there on an undated occasion doing
yard work, that mail addressed to him was
found at unspecified locations within the
house, and that his expired identification card
was found in the room that apparently was
his sleeping quarters, which contained no
marijuana or related paraphernalia. On the
totality of the evidence, a reasonable person
could not find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Clive had even non-exclusive dominion
or control over the area where the marijuana
was found. There was not any evidence at all
beyond the possibility that Clive sometimes
occupied the premises to link Clive Fox to the
marijuana. In addition, there is no evidence
that Clive grew the marijuana plants or participated in producing or distributing the marijuana.
The conviction of Gary Fox is affirmed.
The conviction of Clive Fox is reversed, and
that case is remanded for the purpose of discharging him.
WE CONCUR:
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
HALL, Chief Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting)
I do not join the Court in overturning the
convictions of defendant Clive Fox because I
am not persuaded that the evidence is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
This Court's standard of review when
faced with a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence is to view the evidence, and the facts
reasonably to be inferred therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the determination
made by the trier of fact.1 We will only
interfere when the evidence is so lacking and
insubstantial that a reasonable person could
not possibly have determined guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.2
The evidence was that defendant's identification card and mail addressed to him were
found in the residence. Phone service was in
his name. The neighbors testified that
defendant had lived there with defendant
Gary Fox over a period of three years and
that they had constructed the greenhouse
which was only accessible through a door off
the kitchen. No one else but defendant was
identified as living in the house. Items of
men's clothing were in the bedrooms, dirty
dishes were in the sink, beds were unmade,
and food was stocked in cupboards and in
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the refrigerator, all of which indicated the
house was used as a dwelling.
The entire house was a virtual marijuana
production center. The attached greenhouse
was filled with growing marijuana plants
which made the premises uncomfortably
humid. The doorway from the kitchen
afforded an unobstructed view of the greenhouse and its contents. A large bag of
harvested marijuana was found in the
kitchen, a common area of the house likely to
be used daily by the occupants.
It was certainly reasonable to infer that not
just one but both defendants knew of the
greenhouse and its contents, had the power
and intent to exercise dominion and control
over the marijuana, and were jointly engaged
in growing the marijuana and holding it for
sale.
I would affirm the convictions of both defendants.
Howe, Justice, concurs in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Hall.
1. State v. McCardeil, Utah, 652 P.2d 942,
945 (1982).
2, Id.
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Ronald D. JONES and Pamela Jones,
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v.
AMERICAN COIN PORTFOLIOS, INC., a
California corporation; Robert G. Holt, as
Trustee, L. H. Investment Company, a Utah
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American Coin Portfolios, Inc., a California
corporation, and Oakwood Manor Co., a
California partnership,
Counterclaim and Cross-claim Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Ronald D. Jones, Pamela Jones, Carl E.
Barnes, Mary Barnes, L. H. Investment
Company, a Utah partnership, L. H. Invest-
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meat Group, a Utah corporation, G. Lee
Eastman, Donald J. Boshard and A. Richard
Calder,
Counterclaim and Cross-claim Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 19003
FILED: October 21, 1985
THIRD DISTRICT
Hon. David B. Dee
ATTORNEYS:
Stanley K. Stall, David G. Williams for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Kent T. Anderson for Defendants and Appellants.
DURHAM, Justice:
This is an appeal from an entry of partial
summary judgment in favor of the respondents, Ronald D. Jones and Pamela Jones Clones"). Jones brought a quiet title action on
a parcel of real property, and the appellants,
American Coin Portfolios, Inc. and
Oakwood Manor Co. (hereinafter jointly
referred to as "American Coin"), counterclaimed to foreclose an alleged lien on the same
property. American Coin made a motion for
summary judgment against Jones, which the
trial court denied. In the order denying
American Coin's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court found that
American Coin had no security interest in the
property.
As a result of that finding American Coin
stipulated to an entry of a partial summary
judgment in favor of Jones. Although there
are multiple parties in this case, that partial
summary judgment finally adjudicated the
respective rights of Jones and American
Coin. Therefore, the district court directed
the entry of final judgment, finding that
there was no just reason for delay pursuant
to Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P.
American Coin now seeks to have this
Court reverse the partial summary judgment
and direct the trial court to enter judgment in
its favor or, alternatively, to vacate the
partial summary judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings. We reverse and
direct the trial court to enter judgment in
favor of American Coin.
The transactions that created the security
interest in question were between American
Coin and another defendant to the quiet title
action, L. H. Investment Co., which is not a
party to this appeal. After a series of transactions between L. H. Investment and
American Coin wherein the property had
been used as collateral, the property was
conveyed by L. H. Investment to Jones. A
description of the transactions between
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Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Washington County, J.
Harlan Burns, J., of violating statute proscribing the cultivation and production of
marijuana, a controlled substance, and he
appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J.,
held that evidence that defendant was observed crossing corn fields near areas
where marijuana was growing and was later observed picking leaves from one of the
plants and placing them in a plastic bread
wrapper sack, while sufficient to support a
charge that defendant was in possession of
marijuana, was insufficient to support conviction of cultivating and producing marijuana.
Reversed; information dismissed.
Henriod, J., concurred and filed opinion.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion,
in which Crockett, J., concurred.

Drugs and Narcotics <*=>I09
Evidence that defendant was observed
crossing corn fields near areas where marijuana was growing and was later observed
picking leaves from one of plants and placing them in a plastic bread wrapper sack,
while sufficient to support a charge that
defendant was in possession of marijuana,
was insufficient to support conviction of
cultivating and producing marijuana. U.
C.A.1953,58^7-3(l)(a)(i).

Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for defendant and appellant.
Vernon B. Romncy, Atty. Gen., David L.
Wilkinson, William T. Evans, Asst. Attys.
514 P 2d—30V*

Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
TUCKETT, Justice:
The defendant was charged in the court
below with the violation of Section 58-378(i)(a)(i). U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The
charging part of the information alleges
that on or about the 8th day of August,
1972, at Santa Clara, Washington County,
Utah, the defendant did cultivate and produce marijuana, a controlled substance.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty,
and subsequently a trial was had and the
jury returned a verdict of guilty of the offense charged in the information.
On August 5, 1972, one LaVar Brachcn
discovered that in one of his fields someone was cultivating two small patches of
plants which he suspected were marijuana.
The sheriff of Washington County was
notified and on the same day the sheriff
and Brachen made an examination of the
areas. The plants were growing on high
ground and were not watered by irrigation
of the other farming areas. Depressions
had been made adjacent to the plants and
the ground surrounding the plants was
moist. Buckets and jugs were found near
a creek which was a short distance from
the areas above mentioned. Footprints led
from the areas to the creek. Thereafter
the sheriff and his men placed the areas
under surveillance. On or about the 7th
day of August, the defendant was observed
crossing one of the fields near the areas
where the marijuana was growing. On
August 8th, the defendant was observed
picking leaves from one of the plants and
placing it in a plastic bread wrapper sack.
The sheriff placed the defendant under arrest and charged him with the offense we
are here concerned with. The sheriff testified that after the defendant was in custody he made a statement in substantially
the following language: "Why didn't we
go catch some of these junkies that were
peddling dope and leave us with our marijuana alone?"
It is the defendant's contention here that
the evidence is insufficient to support the
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charge against him that he did cultivate
and produce marijuana. With this contention we must agree. The evidence taken
as whole would only support a charge that
the defendant was in possession of marijuana. Possession alone is insufficient to
show that the defendant cultivated or produced the substance. We conclude that the
defendant's conviction must be reversed
and it is ordered that the information be
dismissed.
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs.
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring):
I concur, believing the State did not
prove its charge beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant did "cultivate and
produce" marijuana. "Cultivate" seems to
be surplusage and not in the statute.1 One
cannot tell whether the jury thought defendant "cultivated" or "produced" or "cultivated and produced." Assuming it
thought defendant "produced" the plant,
there is no evidence that he did. Assuming it thought he simply "cultivated" the
plant, there is no such offense. Assuming
it thought he both "cultivated and produced" the plant, he is not guilty for several reasons: 1) The information is in the
conjunctive, and not severable, and defendant should not be convicted of something
not in the statute; 2) there is no evidence
defendant "produced" the marijuana, and
none about his "cultivating" it,—albeit had
there been he would not have been guilty
of a statutory offense; 3) the facts recited
in the dissent do not show culpability, except if we take gratuitous facts added but
not found in the record nor in the opinion,
when it says, after remarking that somebody was certainly cultivating, the plants
(see footnote), that "They were\his plants"
and that "he was giving them pis attention."
1. 58-87-8(1)(a)(1), U.C.A.1053, as amended,
which aays it it unlawful to "Produce, manufacture or dispense . .
2. It eeetna obrioaa that the trial judge was
referring to the statute which doea not say
"cultivation" ia part of the offense.

It is submitted that there are numerous
hypotheses indulgable in this case just as
consistent with innocence as guilt. An instruction as to this principle should have
and perhaps was in substance given, which,
if not adhered to by the jury would have
resulted in reversible error on conviction.
However, in this case, the jury did not
have, by way of inference, any alternative
but to conclude that the whole backbone of
this case was broken perforce by legal undernourishment.
To the contention made in the dissent
that the "concurring opinion seems to be
unduly technical" because 1) it raises matters not claimed as error on this appeal
and never questioned in the trial court'*
and 2) that anyway "cultivate" and "produce" are synonymous terms:
As to 1): The record reveals the following:
MR. PARK: At this time the state
has rested, the defendant moves the.
court to dismiss this cause as to cultivation and production for the cause and
reason that there hasn't been shown any
cultivation or production
. . . .
T H E COURT: . . . it is true the
state of Utah* does not use the word
cultivation. The court hasn't instructed
the jury on the proposed instructions or
prepared any instructions with respect to
cultivation . . . .
The court is going
to take the motion under advisement
And again, counsel for defendant, at the
time the parties had rested and were given
their opportunities to make exceptions,
made the following exception:
MR. PARK: The defendant hereby
objects to Instruction No. 13 s for the
cause and reason that the instruction is
3. "You are instructed that . . . it it unlawful and a felony for any person knowingly to product a controlled substance, in this
case marijuana." (Significantly, the word
"cultivate" ia left out of the instruction but
appears in the information's charge of the offense)
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inconsistent with the information as it
states that the defendant must only
knowingly and intentionally produce a
controlled substance; said instruction
should state that the defendant should
knowingly and intentionally cultivate and
produce a controlled substance.
I recognize that the defendant did not
claim error on appeal as a specific "Point
on Appeal/' but this case being a criminal
case of felony magnitude, involving a possible prison sentence and record, I think
defendant's statement in his brief that
"The transcript is devoid of any evidence
connecting the defendant with tilling of
the soil, planting, watering or fertilizing
any marijuana plants/' should be considered as at least an unorthodox but nonetheless intended effort to apprise this
court of a matter prejudicial in one degree
or another to his interest, based on the differential between improper accusation and
any attempt to correct it by a so-called curative instruction
As to 2) above, a rather strange development appears to have taken place with respect to the meaning of the word "cultivate." Mr. Justice Ellett is quite right that
Webster's International Dictionary, Second
Edition, published in 1945, has as one of
its definitions of "cultivate" the words "to
produce by culture." 4 Since that time Mr.
Webster has had a change of heart and in
his Third Edition, published in 1959, the
definition quoted by Mr. Justice Ellett does
not appear. .This author ventures the suggestion that the phrase was deleted because
it was quite irreconcilable with the other
supposedly synonymous definitions of "cultivate" as to have caught the lexicographer's eye. For instance, one of the
word's definitions in both editions U "to
loosen or break up the soil about (growing
crops or plants) for the purpose of killing
weeds." Marijuana generally has been
tagged as a "weed," so that by the latter
definition the charge in the information
would have to have been that defendant
was "Killing Weeds and Producing Plants"

which has no semblance of synonymity as
suggested by Mr, Justice Ellett At any
rate, Webster saw fit to correct an abortion of the word, and all we of the majority seek to do is to correct a miscarriage of
the charge, and the interment of a highly
confusing accusatory procedure, whose
memory otherwise might live for quite a
spell behind bars after a conviction born of
error by the state.
For the dissent to say that any error
committed here was harmless in view of
the instruction given,—which actually compounded the initial error,—seems to be a
conclusion found only in the eyes of the
beholder, and not in the statute, nor in the
charge found in the eager information, nor
in the inadequacy of the instruction, nor in
the minds of the veniremen, whose verdict
was "we find the defendant GUILTY of
the felony of 'Producing and Cultivating
Marijuana' as charged in the Information
on file herein," nor in the main opinion,
nor, frankly, this author believes, in any
sufficiency of evidence if presented to a
jury under proper charge and proper instructions.
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent. I could have based my dissent
on the facts as stated in the main opinion,
but I do not do so, for there is more to be
said about the matter.
The defendant neither testified nor produced any evidence at trial, and, therefore,
the evidence on behalf of the State is uncontradicted. That evidence showed that a
trail led up a steep, sandy bank from a
creek to some willow brush on top. Some
of the brush had been cut away so that the
sun could shine on seven or eight marijuana plants. The land was owned by a
stranger to the defendant, and the owner
had given no one authority to grow marijuana or any other plants on his land.
There were several five-gallon cans beside
the creek apparently used to carry water
up the trail to the plants. Each plant was
growing in an artificially-made depression

4. Arguendo, it it attuned that "culture" was related to "cultivate."

